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Abstract
There are many incentives for physicians to dual practice such as an increase in
salary, technology usage, or less work hours. By using the New Institutional Economic
approach, we examine these incentives of physicians in Canada’s health care system in
three scenarios of dual practice. In the first scenario is physicians dual practicing without
any government policies or restrictions in the private sector. In the second scenario,
physicians are not be allow to dual practice, meaning a full out ban of dual practicing. In
the third and final tier, restrictions or government policies will be place in the private
sector while still allowing physicians to dual practice. This paper analyzes which of the
three scenarios best benefit social welfare in Canada’s health care system by examining
the incentives of physicians to dual practice.
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Introduction
Health care is defined as the prevention, treatment, and management of illness and
the preservation of mental and physical well being through the services offered by the
medical, nursing, and allied health professions (Pita & Giralt, 2002). According to the
World Health Organization, health care embraces all the goods and services designed to
promote health, including “preventive, curative and palliative interventions, whether
directed to individuals or to populations” (World Health Organization, 2007). The
organized provision of such services may constitute as a health care system. Health care
systems vary widely from one country to another. Two primary systems used are
socialized medicine and free market. In socialized medicine, government controls the
finance of the health sector, while the free market is where private institutions control the
finance (Martino, 1998). The systems differ in management and control; however, both
systems are identically similar with the involvement of a mixed public-private health
sector. For example, Canada’s health system closely resembles socialized medicine,
containing hospitals and physicians publicly funded by general taxation. However, there
also exist small markets in Canada where hospitals and physicians are privately funded
through individuals or industries.
A mixed public-private health sector paves the way for physicians to dual
practice. Dual practice is when physicians work in both the public and private health
sector. The most common medical areas physicians are likely to dual practice are family
practices or specialists. Family practices may involve being a family doctor, providing
weight loss counseling, ultra-sound testing, IV therapy, total body photography, etc.
Specialists include those who may include being a pediatrics, geriatrics, diabetes,
dermatology or gynecology. Many physicians choose these means of practice as a way to

3

achieve benefits from both the private and public sectors. It is common in many
countries that physicians work in both sectors at the same time, sometimes self-referring
patients from one sector to another. In Spain, for example, the Law of Professional
Incompatibilities that governs the employment of civil servants does not prohibit doctors
from having private practices (Ensor, 2002). The specific legislation for medical
professionals, however, offers those who choose not to dual practice a fixed monthly
bonus in addition to their basic salaries (Ensor, 2002). In Great Britain, physicians who
are employed in the public sector are allowed to operate in the private sector under their
New Health System (NHS) contracts. NHS part-time physicians are not limited in their
private practice, whereas for full-time physicians their private practice is limited to 10%
of their NHS salary (Breeke & Lars, 2006). Indeed, most private medical services are
provided by physicians whose main commitment is to their NHS duties. A report by the
Competition Commission (1994), estimated that 61% of NHS physicians Great Britain
have significant private work. In France, public hospitals employ both full-time and parttime physicians who can also accept private patients with the restriction that income from
private fees is limited to no more than 30% of the physicians’ total income (Ensor, 2002).
Similar arrangements apply in the majority of the European countries which, although
characterized as having public health care systems, also allow private health care.
Success has been seen in Europe using dual practice for it creates incentives strong
enough for many doctors to stay in their home country and practice medicine. Without
the incentives of dual practice, many of Great Britain’s physicians, for an example, might
choose to move to another country such as Spain, where dual practice is allowed, which
may result in a shortage of doctors in Great Britain.
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The question typically raised, mainly from politicians, about dual practice is
whether it is good or bad for the health care system. There seems to be a presumption
that allowing physicians to dual practice will hurt services in the public sector.
Economists are usually quick to point out that allowing a market to operate generally
enhances welfare (Ferrinho 1999). For example, if dual practice is allowed, physicians
can be expected to provide faster and higher quality services in the private sector;
consumers who are willing to pay for these superior services will opt out of the public
system (Gonzalez, 2002). Critics also argue, however, that dual practice may cut back
medical care quality for patients in the public sector and doctors that choose not to dual
practice may also cut back on quality (Gaynor, 1994). Because of the lack of incentives
in the public system, such as less pay or lower quality of technological equipment, this
adverse reaction presents a problem (Gaynor, 1994). This problem consists of the
working effort of a physician and the quality of care given to a patient. Suppose that the
magnitude of these adverse reactions by physicians is positively related to the extent of
dual practice in the private market. More opportunities in the private market may lure
more dedicated doctors to dual practice. These opportunities may also induce physicians
who dual practice to shirk more in the public system as they focus more of their effort in
the private sector. Reducing the scope of dual practice will reduce these negative effects
and limit private market operations. For example, a price ceiling on physicians’ earnings
in the private market may enhance overall welfare. The ceiling reduces some surplus in
the private market, but controls the quality deterioration in the public system (Rickman &
McGuire, 1999).
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Within the differences of incentives between the public and private sectors, there
is also a difference between the market participants. Not every physician chooses to dual
practice. There are physicians that are devoted to providing good quality to the public
sector despite the lack of incentives, therefore rejecting dual practice opportunities
(Frenk, 1993). The presence of these physicians, which we will call ‘public’ physicians,
allows us to understand why health care quality in public sectors do not tend to be
extremely poor. If dual practice incentives make some of these ‘public’ doctors change
their position and turn to dual practice, then there will be that adverse effect on the
quality in the public sector. There is even more fear of quality deterioration when
physicians who dual practice may reduce quality in the public sector much more than if
physicians were not allowed to dual practice (Rickman & McGuire, 1999). Without dual
practice, physicians do not have the incentives to showcase their talents as superb doctors
to promote their private practice. Knowing they will receive a fixed salary in the public
sector, and with nothing to gain from the private sector, physicians would shirk even
more. Dual practitioners may shirk on hours worked in the public sector to spend time in
private practice. Meanwhile, dual practice providers may also misuse government
supplies and equipment in the treatment of private sector patients, thus undoubtedly
undermining the efficiency of public delivery. In any of these circumstances, dual
practice leads to adverse behavior in the public sector.
In this paper, dual practice is examined through a New Institutional Economic
approach based on physicians’ incentives. With dual practice already being unrestricted
in Canada, physicians’ incentives to do dual practice is more predictable and
understandable in comparison with other countires with bans or restrictions on dual
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practice. Dual practice in Canada’s health care system will be examined in three cases,
where two out of the three cases are hypothetical. The first case consists of physicians
dual practicing without any restrictions or policies being put in place in the private sector.
In the second case, physicians will not be allowed to dual practice, meaning physicians
could only choose to work in one health sector or the other. The third case is where
physicians are able to dual practice, though policies or restrictions, such as a price ceiling
on services, will be implemented. In each of the three cases, incentives and social
welfare patients and physicians will be closely examined.
Canada’s Health System
Canada’s health care system is publicly funded that is, it is a form of socialized
medicine. The various levels of Canada’s government pays for about 70% of Canadians’
health care costs, which is about average for a developed country (CBC, 2006). The
Canadian government also pays almost 100% of hospital and physician care (CBC,
2006). The payments for hospital and physician care are covered by Medicare, the
largest government health program. Medicare is the Canadian insurance system provided
by the Canada Health Act. Under the terms of this act, all Canadian citizens and landed
immigrants (equivalent to U.S. green card holders) are entitled to receive medically
necessary hospital services, physician services and surgical-dental services (Health
Canada, 2006). The system is funded by Canada's federal government through transfer
payments to all provinces and territories, and is supported through taxes. All Canadians
receive medical care regardless of yearly income or ability to pay for the care (Health
Canada, 2006). Although Canada maintains a publicly funded system, 30% of Canadian
health care is undertaken in the private sector (CBC, 2006). Many Canadians have
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private health insurance, often through their employers, that covers some of the expenses
in the private health sector (CBC, 2006). One of the liked features of the Canadian
private health sector is the minimal paper work that has to be filled out in comparison to
the public sector. Instead of having a third party involved with health payments, patients
may pay the fees directly to the physician without having to fill multiple forms.
Family doctors in Canada make an average of $202,000.00 a year (CTV, 2006).
Alberta has the highest average salary of around $230,000.00, while Quebec has the
lowest average annual salary $165,000.00 (CTV, 2006). Specialists’ average salaries are
even higher at about $278,000 (CTV, 2006). If doctors dual practice in Canada, their
salary could potentially increase up to $400,000.00 for a specialist and $300,000.00 for a
family doctor (CTV, 2006). All provinces in Canada allow dual practice with the
exception of Quebec which creates local shortages as most physicians search for a better
salary outside of Quebec (CMA, 2007). Nationally, doctors are represented by the
Canadian Medical Association. The CMA works to enforce national standards in
Canada’s health care system. Each province regulates its medical profession through a
self-governing College of Physicians and Surgeons. The College of Physicians and
Surgeons is responsible for licensing physicians, setting practice standards, and
investigating and disciplining its members.
There are two main criticisms of Canada’s health system from patients and
politicians alike; wait times and lack of advance technological equipment in the public
sector. The wait times to be treated in hospitals can be weeks or months, including for
simple procedures. According to the Frasier Institute (2007), treatment time from initial
referral by a general practitioner through consultation with a specialist to final treatment,
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across all specialties and all procedures (emergency, non-urgent, and elective), averaged
17.7 weeks. There are long waits for some non-emergency procedures, notably hip- and
knee-replacement surgery, plastic surgeries, and eye surgery (Krauss, 2006).
Although the criticisms of technological equipment have been coming from
Canadian’s physicians, patients have also been complaining about the out-of-date
equipment (Krauss, 2006). Patients not only wants a good doctor but also have the
physician to diagnosis and treat them with the most advanced technological equipments
that are available. Advanced technological equipment refers not only to machinery and
devices, but also to pharmaceutical and surgical innovations. According to the OECD 1
(2002), Canada ranks poorly, compared to other developed countries, when it comes to
access to high-tech care. There is less access for patients to receive a diagnosis through
the usage of advanced technological equipment in the public health sector compared to
the private sector. This does not mean that Canada’s public health sector does not have
advanced technological equipment. Rather, the advanced technological equipment are
just less available and harder to come by in public hospitals compared to private
hospitals.
Physicians’ Motives to Dual Practice in Canada
It is important to understand why doctors decide to combine public and private
practice by taking a second job. There exist four reasons on what motivates Canadian
doctors to dual practice. These four approaches consist of hour restrictions, job
complementarities, professional and institutional factors, and personal issues (Paxson et.
al, 1996).
1

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: consist of 30 countries sharing expertise,
exchanging views, and creating research studies to support sustainable economic growth, boost
employment, raise living standards, maintain financial stability, and contribute to world growth in trade
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1. Hours Restriction Approach
The standard economic model for explaining dual job holding is based on the idea
that individuals have an endowment of time, on the basis of which they choose the
number of hours they wish to devote to work and leisure in order to maximize their
utility. A doctor willing but unable to work more hours in his main job will take a second
job provided it offers a high enough wage. In this line, Moses (1962) presents dual job
holding as a special case of overtime work. His results predict that a worker, or a doctor
in this case, will be willing to accept part-time employment in a secondary occupation if
he is an income maximizer who is unable to obtain sufficient overtime work in his
primary employment. This framework has specific applications to the health sector.
Culler and Bazzoli (1985) show that the number of hours spent by Canada’s physicians in
their primary job strongly influence whether or not they decide to take a second job.
2. Job Complementarities
Although hour constraints have traditionally explained the existence of dual job
holding, there are other factors that also require consideration. Paxson and Sicherman
(1996) identify other factors that influence a worker’s decision to supplement his or her
primary job with secondary employment:
(A) Complementary earnings: While one job might provide a steady but low income, the
second might offer wages that are high on average but more variable. Substantial
benefits from private practice lead physicians to take secondary employment in the
private sector in order to supplement their low public income and increase their overall
earnings (Ma, 1994). Culler and Bazzoli (1985) also find support for this decision. They
show that Canadian doctors opting for dual practices are highly influenced not only by
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time spent at their primary job but also by the wage potential of a second job and their
public salaries. Lerberghe et al. (2002), using a survey conducted among a sample of
physicians from different low and middle income countries, observed that dual practice
would add an extra 50 to 80% to their public sector salaries.
(B) Non-financial benefits: One job provides the main source of income for a physician
while another job can provide non-financial benefits, such as professional training and
improvement, contacts, cooperation with other hospitals, prestige, etc. Assuming that
physicians perform their main job in the public sector, it would be secondary jobs at
private clinics that would enhance their prestige and professional reputation and
encourage them into dual employment (Rickman & McGuire, 1999). Canadian
physicians are concerned for their reputation in the primary post as long as their work in
the public sector enables them to generate positive externalities in their private practices.
(C) New skills and experience: Second jobs can also be used by workers to gain
experience and learn about new occupations or techniques. A study based on data from
the UK (Brekke & Lars, 2006) shows that apart from hour constraints, individuals are
willing to take a second job in order to obtain additional skills and experience beyond the
scope of their primary position. Through secondary employment in the private sector,
many physicians have access to better technology and resources than they would find in
the public sector.
3. Professional and Institutional Factors
The workload and physical comfort of the working environment may influence a
doctor to dual practice. A study by Johnson (1995) in Norway shows that high work load
and stress in public hospitals (stemming from both high demand and poor organization)
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lead physicians to allocate some time to working outside the hospital. Secondly, the
“public” status of the employer in the primary job is also relevant. Public institutions are
often financed through soft budgets, giving management leeway to be relaxed about
financial discipline and general functioning (Lerberghe et al., 2002). Moreover,
employees within these public facilities receive limited managerial discretion over
recruitment, pay and discipline. Additional problems are weak monitoring systems and
low probability of formal sanctions. As a result, physicians are allowed broad discretion
as to the degree of effort or effective time they spend on their work, which makes it very
easy for them to engage in dual practice and/or leave the public premises during duty
hours to attend their private practices. In short, many health workers resort to dual
practice as a reaction to the shortcomings of the organizations in which they work, and
not only because of low public sector wages, as often claimed. They are seeking the
professional satisfaction and self-realization that the primary public job does not always
offer (Lerberghe et al., 2002). Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that there are some
professional factors that motivate health care personnel to continue to stay in the public
service. The desire for interaction and influence among fellow professionals and peer
approval, are other factors that physicians value and public hospitals can provide
(Eisenberg, 1986).
4. Personal Factors
Research has shown dual job holding patterns to vary with personal
characteristics such as sex, age and family structure. Chawla (1996) finds that older
physicians tend to work less in their primary jobs, as do those with higher salaries.
Further, he observes that private fees in the second job increase with specialization and
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years of practice, makes dual practice more appealing for senior doctors. Although dual
practice is usually more common among senior doctors, who have already built a
reputation in their public work, there are exceptions. Young male doctors are the most
frequent dual practitioners in Canada (Dent, 2004). Men are more likely than women to
participate in a private practice in Canada (Dent, 2004).
A Basic Model of Dual Practice
Using physicians’ motives to dual practice in Canada, there are several different
incentives arrangements within this category as portrayed in both Tables 1 and 2. Table 1
portrays that physicians could work in both the public and private sectors, carrying out
their primary activity in the public sector, while also engaging in private practice,
performing similar clinical tasks in both sectors. Specifically, Table 1 depicts physicians
choosing to work in public sector, full-time or part-time, as their primary job. It is then
the physician’s choice whether or not to hold a secondary job in the private sector. In
contrast, physicians may also carry out their primary activity in the private sector, while
also engaging in public practice as a secondary job. Table 2 shows physicians choosing
to work in the private sector, full-time or part-time, as their primary job. Again, it is then
the physicians’ choice whether or not to hold a secondary job, but this time the secondary
job is in the public sector. Having a full time position consists of physicians working 35
hours per week in both tables (Oliveira & Pinto, 2005). Working a full-time position
with a secondary job, physicians may extend their work hours from 35 to 42 hours per
week (Oliveira & Pinto, 2005). Physicians who choose to work two part-time positions
are working in hours similar to that of a full-time position (Oliveira & Pinto, 2005).
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Table 1. Incentives to Dual Practice when holding a Primary Public Job

Secondary Job
Holds no Secondary
Job

Private
Part-time

- interaction and
influence among fellow
professionals

- more hours (overtime)
- enhance prestige and
professional reputation

- peer approval
- gain experience and
learn new occupations
and techniques

Primary Job

Public
Full-time

- increase overall
earnings

- professional
satisfaction and selfrealization

Public
Part-time

- enhance prestige and
professional reputation
- No Incentives

- gain experience and
learn new occupations
and techniques
- professional
satisfaction and selfrealization

- Full-time public & no secondary job
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For our purpose, physicians who work only in the public sector, holding no secondary
job, are labeled as ‘public’ physicians. These ‘public’ physicians work not for financial
benefits but rather for incentives such as having constant interaction and influence among
fellow professionals. Also, the incentive to have peer approval causes some physicians to
want to work only in the public sector. ‘Public’ physicians are not driven by the
incentive of increasing their salary, but rather the incentive of obtaining social benefits.
‘Public’ physicians could be seen as dedicated physicians concern more importantly with
the social welfare of patients rather than one’s own financial benefits
- Full-time public & part-time private
Many physicians have a full-time primary job in the public sector and a part-time
secondary job in the private sector. This is the case for physicians who, having
completed their hours in a public hospital, work extra hours in a private hospital. This is
the most common case of dual practice as there are more incentives offered as portrayed
in Table 1. The ability to work more hours allow physicians to increase overall earnings
to supplement their insufficient public salary (Ma, 1994). Physicians are also able to
enhance his or her reputation as they are capable of gaining more experience and learning
new occupational techniques in different medical areas (Brekke & Lars, 2006).
Enhancing one’s reputation as a physician may lead to more patients transferring to their
private practice therefore resulting in an increase of salary (Ma, 1994).
- Part-time public and part-time private
Physicians may work part-time in both the public and private sectors. The salary of
working two part-time jobs is lesser and differs widely then working a full-time and a
part-time position. The incentives to work part-time public and part-time private are
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more for non-financial benefits. These non-financial benefits consist of enhancing one’s
reputation or gaining experience in other medical areas. Also, there is the incentive to
seek the professional satisfaction and self-realization that the primary public job does not
always offer (Lerberghe et al., 2002). Both Table 1, above, and Table 2, below, depicts
this category.

Table 2.Incentives to Dual Practice when holding a Primary Private Job

Secondary Job
Holds no Secondary
Job

- more hours
(overtime)

- increase overall
- higher salary
earnings
depending on the
success of the practice - peer approval
- enhance prestige
and professional
reputation

Private
Part-time

Primary Job

Private
Full-time

- workload and
physical comfort of
working environment

Public
Part-time

- No incentives

- gain experience
and learn new
occupations and
techniques
- professional
satisfaction and selfrealization

- Full time private work & no secondary job
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Physicians working full-time in the private sector, with no public secondary job, are
interested in being more comfortable in their working environment. Working exclusively
in the private sector, physicians have more control in their workload compare to the
public sector (Johnson, 1995). Private’s salary compare to the salary in the public sector
will vary for physicians. The salary for private sector will depend on the how successful
the practice is.
- Full-time private work & a part-time public job
Physicians may hold a full-time position in the private sector while holding a part-time
post in the public sector. This arrangement is also found in the UK, where physicians
usually tend to maintain their public posts. The Competition Commission (1994) showed
that 25% of public part-time consultants in the UK opted to dedicate most of their time to
private practice. Incentives for physicians to do this are to supplement their private
earnings with a fixed salary of the public sector and the interaction for peer approval as
shown in Table 2.
As quality of health care provision is difficult to assess, we estimate public sector
quality on the basis of observable variables such as waiting time (Cullis & Jones, 1985).
Therefore in Canada, the quality of a patient’s care is based on wait times and access to
advanced technological equipment, taking into account that these two were the main
criticisms from Canadian patients in the public sector. A basic equation representing this
is Qs = f(Te , W) where the service quality (Qs) is equal to the function of access to
advanced technological equipment (Te) and the wait time (W) a patient has to endure.
The high quality service consists of a less waiting time and more access to advance
technology equipment: QsH = f(↑Te , ↓W). In contrast, low quality service consists of a
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longer waiting time and less access to advance technology equipment: QsL = f(↓Te , ↑W).
Typically, low quality service pertains to the public health sector while high quality
service pertains to the private sector. Depending on whether the physician is ‘public’ or a
dual practitioner, the quality of health services in the public or private sector can improve
or worsen depending on what his or her incentives are. With this setup, questions such
as, “Are the incentives of dual practice strong enough to lead ‘public’ physicians to
become dual practitioners?” or “Are the social welfare of patients improving or
worsening?”, could be examined in three scenarios. These three scenarios consist of dual
practice without restrictions, banning dual practice, and dual practice with restrictions. A
physician’s incentives and the effects they have on social welfare in these three scenarios
will help us study and answer these questions.
Dual Practice without Restrictions
Public or private dual practice is often believed to harm public health services,
even when it is legal. Physicians working in both sectors may have incentives to reduce
effort and time and also divert patients from the public to the private sector. Some dual
practitioners may be motivated to devote most of their time to their private
practice, thus drifting into shirking of effort in their primary public job. This is
aggravated when doctors in the public sector are paid a monthly salary as opposed to the
fee-for-service or hourly rate paid in the private sector. Furthermore, physicians holding
full-time posts in public facilities have little remaining time to work in the private sector
and may therefore shirk on time in the public post to work longer hours in the private
sector. Although this is more likely when doctors work full-time in the public sector, it
may also occur when doctors combine a part-time public sector job with part-time private
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practice. Even if physicians do not shirk on work hours at their public job, they may
perform with less attentiveness when holding two jobs. In this line, working in the
private sector may motivate physicians to reduce their work effort in the public sector. In
return, this could cause an increase in wait times (↑W) for patients. However, most dual
practitioners may avoid this type of behavior due to the reputation effect. Physicians may
be interested in building a good reputation at their public post in order to guarantee a flow
of demand for their private services. This scenario gives us insight into the strategic
effects of the physician’s work in both sectors. These effects may encourage a tendency
to over-provide services in the public health sector use as a signaling device (Rickman &
McGuire, 1999). Over-providing services by dual practitioners could lessen the wait time
for patients to endure and increase the chances for patients to gain access to more
advanced equipment → QsH = f(↑Te , ↓W). There is a belief that over-providing services
in the public sector will lead more patients to opt out of the public sector and be
diagnosed at the physician’s private practice (Rickman & McGuire, 1999). Patients
assume the over-providing service they receive in the public sector will be the same, or
even better, in the private sector of the dual practitioner.
Allowing dual practice may also lead physicians to persuade patients to transfer
out of the public sector into the private sector. Financial motivation again seems to play
a key role in fostering this behavior. The lack of incentives in the public sector compared
to private hospitals may lead dual practitioners to deliberately transfer public patients into
their private practice. Persuading patients to transfer may occur either through direct
referrals, as physicians may explicitly advise patients to demand private treatment or,
more subtly, through indirect referrals. By indirect referrals we refer to the different
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ways in which dual practitioners may persuade patients to switch from public to private
facilities. This can include shirking on quality of service or lengthening waiting times or
waiting lists in public hospitals (↑W). In this sense, dual practice may result in poorer
quality service in public hospitals, thus widening the quality gap between the public and
private sectors. However, a quality reduction in public provision may have adverse
consequences for a physician’s reputation in the private practice. In particular, patients
may react harshly against dishonest physicians. Therefore, dual practitioners may have
incentives to provide excessive quality in the public sector in order to raise their prestige
as private doctors (Rickman & McGuire, 1999). Also, a theoretical study has found a
link between the waiting time for public hospital treatment and the behavior of dual
health providers (Iversen, 1997). Thus, waiting time in the public sector increases if
physicians are also allowed to work in the private sector. These results are supported by
empirical evidence from Italy, where dual practice has encouraged doctors to run long
lists in government clinics to maintain demand for private treatment (France et al., 2005).
Also, there is empirical evidence in Alberta, Canada, where dual practice surgeons’
waiting lists for publicly insured cataract surgeries were longer than those of practitioners
operating in the public system alone (Armstrong, 2000).
Referring patients from the public health sector to the private sector creates
another incentive for dual practitioners. This incentive is to only refer patients according
to the severity of their condition or ability to recover. Dual practitioners may be tempted,
in particular, to refer the less severe or less costly patients to their private practice (Barros
& Olivella, 2005). Although dual practitioner may have an incentive to offer their private
services to the least severely ill, only the more severe patients in this sub-group are
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willing to pay for private treatment. Also, referrals are sometimes made from the private
to the public sector, which occurs when dual practitioners refer their private patients to
the public system to avoid high cost treatments (Barros & Olivella, 2005). Having the
ability to refer public patients to use their private services, dual practitioners may focus
only on wealthy and higher income patients, following classic price discrimination. This
has been said to be a positive side effect of dual practice: humane providers may counsel
poor patients to receive free or heavily subsidized care in the public clinic or hospital,
while referring to their private practice only those who can clearly afford it (Eggleston &
Bir, 2006). This would result in public health facilities becoming more effectively
targeted to the poor, reducing public waiting lists (↓W), and increasing the access to
technological equipment (↑Te), by curbing demand for public health services (Eggleston
& Bir, 2006). We must treat this reasoning with caution, however, since it could also be
argued that unless private care is superior, a rich patient will not be interested in paying
for private care. This may create a gap between the quality of care received by the rich
and the poor. Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that poor and uneducated patients
are more likely to respond to encouragement to use private services and thus to pay for
expensive private treatment instead of using subsidized public care. Burchardt, Hills and
Propper (1999) found that approximately 70% of private health care users in Canada in
1995 were in the top two income quintiles, but 30% were in the bottom three.
Although there is a large presence of dual practitioners, not all physicians choose
to dual practice (Frenk, 1993). In our case, these physicians are known as ‘public’
physicians. In our assumption, these physicians are devoted to seeing the public health
sector improve and therefore exert their effort only in the public sector. ‘Public’
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physicians treat every patient as equally as possible exerting the same amount of effort to
provide the highest possible quality of service possible. However, we must mention that
these ‘public’ physicians could be lemons as well. Seeing that some colleagues earn
more prestige or non-financial benefits from a private practice, a ‘public’ physician may
feel unappreciated (Rickman & McGuire, 1999). This dissatisfaction may lead the
‘public’ physician to refuse to provide high quality service but rather provide low quality
service to the patient. The ‘public’ physician, acting as a lemon, may continue to provide
low service quality in the public sector without participating in dual practice to show their
dissatisfaction. Though, the most likely case is that the ‘public’ physician will become a
dual practitioner where their disutility of seeing their colleagues earn more prestige is
compensated for.
Banning Dual Practice
The ability for Canada’s physicians to dual practice is the result of a policy choice
by the province’s government, not the federal government (Health Canada, 2006). In
Canada, every province, except for Quebec, allows physicians to dual practice (CMA,
2007). In this case, we will now assume each province’s government will follow
Quebec’s policy in disallowing dual practice. This means that physicians must
exclusively work full-time in the public or private health sector. More than likely
physicians will choose to work in the public sector for it is costly to maintain and uphold
a private practice without a second income (Brekke & Sogard, 2006). Though there may
be some physicians who have the income to support a private practice and therefore
choose to participate in the private sector. Nevertheless, the private market will shrink,

22

due to the banning of dual practice, as the majority of physicians will choose to practice
in the public health sector rather than the private sector.
Banning physicians’ ability to dual practice takes away lucrative incentives, such
as a higher salary, the preference for longer/shorter hours, obtaining additional skills, etc.
Previously, allowing dual practice enables Canada’s government to recruit quality
providers at low cost, as the total compensation package governments offer to physicians
includes both public salaries and the non-wage benefit of private practice revenues
(Health Canada, 2006). In contrast, banning dual practice reduces the attraction of public
service employment, especially for higher skilled physicians and most senior doctors
who, taking advantage of their already well-established reputations within the public
sector, might migrate to the private sector, where the pay equipment and facilities are
usually better. If a large percentage of the best doctors opt out of the public system, the
overall quality of public care will suffer. In Quebec, for example, a ban on private
practice as a secondary job led to migration of the best physicians in to the private sector
for full time jobs or to other provinces (CTV, 2006). In this case, allowing dual practice
might be a key policy to retain high-skilled doctors at public facilities or even to prevent
their migration to other countries.
Allowing dual practice enable physicians to provide services outside normal
working hours in their private offices and offer their public patients the option to obtain
quicker treatment and avoid the long waiting lists common in the public sector. As a
result this could lower wait times (↓W) in the public sector since more patients are
choosing to opt to the private sector. However, with the banning of dual practice,
physicians are not able to offer such an option to a patient and therefore wait times could
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increase as more and more patients choose to stay in the public sector. As mention
before, the public health sector is already at low quality service, QsL = f(↓Te , ↑W), which
means the banning of dual practice will only deteriorate low quality service even more
due to an increase in wait time and less access to technological equipment.
Again, if dual practice is allowed, the doctor with a private practice has the
incentive to improve his reputation as a good doctor believing it will benefit his private
practice. As mentioned before, the dual practitioner will then opt to use the strategy of
over-providing service in his primary job to improve his reputation. However, now that
dual practice is banned, the physician has no incentive to improve his image or reputation
as a good doctor. Under the salary of the primary job, the physician has no incentive to
exert his maximum effort to improve his reputation since having a secondary job is not
allowed. Therefore the physician would most likely shirk in his effort when providing
service. The shirking effort of the physician could possibly create a longer waiting time
for the patient and the amount of effort exerted by the physician to obtain advance
technological equipment for the patient is lessened. The patient will end up receiving QsL
= f(↓Te , ↑W). These physicians, who want to dual practice but now are unable to, lowers
the social welfare of patients in the public sector by constantly maintaining low quality
service rather than trying to improve the service. Most patients have no other choice but
to stay in the public sector for they are unable to afford the private practice. Some
patients who are able to afford a treatment in a private practice may choose to opt out,
however, due to the shrinking private market, the accessibility to a private practice may
be hard to come by. This results in patients staying in the public health sector, rather then
opting out, and continues receiving the low quality service.
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A ‘public’ physician may be the only best source where the social welfare of the
patient is not lowered due to the banning of dual practice. When dual practice is allowed,
there is a possibility that these ‘public’ physicians are lemons. The dissatisfaction of
seeing their fellow colleagues earn more prestige or non-pecuniary benefits from dual
practice could cause these ‘public’ physicians to shirk and lower their effort to showcase
their dissatisfaction. The banning of dual practice takes away the feelings of being
unappreciated and dissatisfaction felt by the ‘public’ physician. The physician has no
dissatisfaction to showcase or the incentives to become a dual practitioner. The physician
will now focus primarily on improving the public health sector by treating every patient,
exerting his maximum amount of effort to provide quality service. The patient will
constantly receive QsH with less waiting time to endure and more access to advanced
technological equipment exerted by the effort of the ‘public’ physician.
Dual Practice with Restrictions
There are alternative regulatory frameworks that Canada could use, which have
been shown to work, that exist in some countries with mixed health care systems: France,
Spain and the U.K. These three countries implement alternative regulations that can be
categorized in two branches. First, the Spanish system uses exclusive contracts to keep
dual practice at a minimum. In Spain, those doctors who work for the public sector are
allowed to have their private practices if they wish to. If, however, they decide to forego
this privilege, they receive a fixed monthly bonus in return for such exclusive contracting
(Ensor, 2002). Secondly, the French and English systems, where the physicians’ dual
practice, although permitted, is restricted. In these countries, public physicians’ private
earnings cannot exceed a certain threshold (price ceiling) (Brekke & Lars, 2006). Such a
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threshold is computed in the UK on the basis of physicians’ public revenues and in
France on the basis of their total income (Brekke & Lars, 2006).
Offering Canadian physicians an exclusive contract with extra economic
compensation is meant to have the physician forego his private practice. In the case of a
contract being offered, the physician can either accept it and work exclusively in the
public sector or reject it and be a dual practitioner. Due to the lack of incentives when
working exclusively in the public sector, physicians often choose to have a secondary job
in the private sector to fulfill his financial wants. An exclusive contract will offer and
fulfill these financial wants, by providing a fixed monthly bonus in return for not being a
dual practitioner and prevent some from converting to be a dual practitioner (Ensor,
2002). Exclusive contracts would also persuade the ‘public’ physician not to become a
dual practitioner as it lessens the dissatisfaction of seeing their fellow colleagues earning
more prestige or non-pecuniary benefits from dual practice as now more physicians are
choosing to stay in the public sector. The exclusive contracts therefore prevent ‘public’
physicians from shirking and lowering their effort to showcase their dissatisfaction. As
mentioned, exclusive contracts are not required to be accepted. This means physicians
still have the option to become dual practitioner. If exclusive contracts do not satisfy the
needs for some physicians, they still have the choice to become a dual practitioner and
receive the benefits/incentives of dual practice. Giving physicians the options of
exclusive contracts or becoming dual practitioners does not worsen the social welfare of
patients. Physicians may still use the over-providing strategy if they choose to dual
practice while the exclusive contract keeps ‘public’ physicians in the public sector.
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The policy currently enforced in countries such as France and the UK is the
regulation imposed on the upper bound of the amount of public physicians’ private
earnings. This is the form of price ceiling in the private health sector. With the Spanish
regulation, the public health authority has absolutely no power, as it cannot impose the
physicians to sign the exclusive contract. In the French-English system, on the other
hand, the public health authority goes one step beyond. Even if Canada’s government
power is restricted, since it cannot forbid physicians to dual practice, it can limit this dual
provision by fixing an upper bound on the physicians’ private earnings. However, in
order for the price ceiling to work, there must be enough incentives for physicians to
either dual practice while at the same time not affecting the social welfare of the patients.
This means the price ceiling must not be too high or too low. If the price ceiling is high,
then dual practitioners freely contract with consumers in the private market, resulting in
high efficiency there, but this implies a high level of shirking by ‘public’ physicians in
the public sector as they still see their colleagues earning more prestige and/or nonfinancial benefits. In a way, a high price ceiling is the same as allowing dual practice
without restrictions. In contrast, if the price ceiling is low, dual practitioners do not find
it very worthwhile to participate in the private market, but the level of shirking by these
physicians in the public system may increase as they no longer have the incentive to
over-provide service to increase their reputation. However, shirking will be at a
minimum since some physicians may still choose to dual practice to gain those nonfinancial benefits such as more experience or training. An optimal choice of the price
ceiling for Canada balances the inefficiency in the quality for consumers with high
segment of severity against the lower quality received by consumers with lower segment
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of severity who are treated by dual practitioners in the public sector (Brekke & Lars,
2006). Similar to exclusive contracts, a price ceiling on dual practice still gives
physicians the option of whether to dual practice or not. A price ceiling may take away
increased earnings that physicians could receive in their secondary job however
physicians may still choose to dual practice for the price ceiling will still be beneficial to
supplement his primary salary. Also, physicians still can gain non-financial benefits if
they choose to dual practice. A price ceiling on dual practice will minimize the number
of participating physicians therefore lessening the dissatisfaction of ‘public’ physicians
seeing their fellow colleagues earning more prestige. Again, similar to exclusive
contracts, price ceiling allow physicians to still use the over-providing strategy if they
chooses to dual practice while it also keeps ‘public’ physicians in the public sector.
Conclusion
The main issue with dual practice in Canada is whether or not restrictions should
be enforced. To illustrate the main features of the incentives to dual practice, we present
two diagrams of incentives in the health sector based on the public versus private nature
of each job. Amongst the different forms of dual practice, we focus on analyzing fulltime public and part-time private job holdings, as we believe that the potential adverse
welfare implications of this particular form make it worthy to specifically analyze.
Public health sector is usually characterized by fixed payment in the form of salaries and
the interaction among colleagues, while in the private health sector the use of incentives
seems to be more widespread. This creates clear financial and non-financial incentives
for physicians in the public sector to maximize their private sector activity, which might
be expected to undermine their public performance. Due to the lack of incentive
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mechanisms in the public sector, there are adverse implications on social welfare of
patients. Thus, common problems in a setting where dual practice are not restricted are
that physicians shirk on working hours, practice patient diversion and selection, and
misuse public equipment and facilities. Also, ‘public’ physicians are more likely to
become dual practitioners to fulfill their disutility of seeing their colleagues earning the
non-financial benefits of dual practice. However, these adverse implications of public on
private dual practice may be ease thanks to factors like the reputation effect. In this
sense, there is evidence from the UK showing how public physicians, with greater private
than public commitments, are more productive in their primary public job than those with
less commitment to the private sector (Commission, 1994). Also, dual practice may have
physicians provide faster services in the private sector therefore allowing consumers, who
are willing to pay for this, to opt out of the public system, creating easier access for those
remaining on the public waiting list.
The scenario of banning physicians’ ability to dual practice is a policy meant to
decrease physicians shirking on working hours, practicing patient diversion and selection,
and misusing public equipment and facilities. Also, it is to eliminate the possibility of
more and more physicians becoming dual practitioners. However, our analysis, backed
by evidence seen in Quebec, has shown that this policy worsen the social welfare of the
public health sector. The banning of dual practice causes physicians, who wants to dual
practice, to either move out of the province in search for a better job with better
incentives or stay and just shirk in effort. The shirking effort of the physician could
possibly create a longer waiting time for the patient and the amount of effort exerted by
the physician to obtain advance technological equipment for the patient is lessened. The
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patient will end up receiving QsL = f(↓Te , ↑W). These physicians, who want to dual
practice but now is unable to, lowers the aggregate welfare of patients in the public sector
by constantly maintaining low quality service rather than trying to improve the service.
Allowing dual practice without restrictions and banning dual practice is unlikely
to result in an improvement in the social welfare of patients. As a result, some
governments in Europe have restrictions on dual practice, which have been shown to
work. The introduction to exclusive contracts or a price ceiling on the physicians’ private
earning may be the best choice for Canada’s health care system. An exclusive contract
will offer and fulfill the financial wants of physicians, by providing a fixed monthly
bonus in return for not being a dual practitioner and prevent some from converting to be a
dual practitioner (Ensor, 2002). Meanwhile, a price ceiling may take away increased
earnings that physicians could receive in their secondary job, however physicians may
still choose to dual practice for the price ceiling will still be beneficial to supplement his
primary salary. Both exclusive contracts and price ceiling allow physicians to still use
the over-providing strategy if they choose to dual practice, while also keeping ‘public’
physicians in the public sector. From this analysis, the social welfare of people in
Canada’s mixed health care system will be better off where restrictions on dual practice
are present.
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Appendix A (Source: OECD, 2002)
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